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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BRENT "W" BROWN, ] 
Plaintiff/Appellant, ] 
vs. ] 
GERALDINE K. BROWN, ] 
Defendant/Respondent. 
i Case No. 890293-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION OF COURT 
The Order and Judgment which modified a 1986 Decree of 
Divorce previously entered was signed and entered by the Court on 
April 7, 1989. The Notice of Appeal was filed May 4, 1989. 
This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal in this matter 
by virtue of the Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, Section 1 
et seq., Section 78-2a-l et seq. Utah Code Ann. (1953 as 
amended), and Rule 3 R. Utah Ct. App. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from an Order and Judgment signed by the 
Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen of the First Judicial District 
Court of Cache County, State of Utah. The Order and Judgment 
modified a 1986 Decree of Divorce signed and entered by the same 
court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
increasing alimony and child support where Geraldine Brown failed 
to meet her burden of showing a substantial change in 
circumstances necessitating the increase. 
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and 
misunderstood or misapplied the law by increasing alimony and 
child support where Geraldine Brown produced no evidence of a 
necessity for the increase or of her inability to aid in her own 
and the children's support, and the Court made no findings on 
necessity and ability, the Court focused its ruling only on an 
increase in Brent Brown's income. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves the modification of a divorce decree. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
After a trial, Brent Brown and Geraldine Brown were divorced 
by a Decree of Divorce signed and filed by the District Court on 
March 28, 1986. 
On or about December 14, 1987, Geraldine Brown filed a 
petition to modify the Decree of Divorce. 
Trial on the petition to modify was held on February 28, 
1989, before the Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen. Judge 
Christoffersen signed and filed the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Order and Judgment on April 7, 1989. 
Brent Brown filed this appeal on May 4, 1989. 
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT 
The relevant portion of the Decree of Divorce provided, 
based on a finding of a minimum of $54,000.00 per year income to 
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Brent Brown, that Brent Brown pay Geraldine Brown $300.00 per 
month per child in support for each of the Browns' three children 
and $200.00 per month alimony. 
The relevant portion of the Order and Judgment modifying 
the Decree provided, based on a finding of $72,000.00 per year 
income to Brent Brown, that Brent Brown pay Geraldine Brown 
$700.00 per month per child in support for the two remaining 
children, and $500.00 per month alimony. Geraldine Brown was 
also awarded a $3,000.00 judgment against Brent Brown for 
attorney fees and costs. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Brent Brown and Geraldine Brown were divorced by Decree 
of Divorce on March 28, 1986. (Record 50-2.) At the time of 
the decree, Brent Brown was unemployed. In setting child support 
and alimony, the trial court imputed income to Brent Brown. 
Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the trial court's findings made at the time 
of the decree state: 
7. That although [Brent Brown] is 
currently unemployed, his past work record 
and potential means that he is reasonably 
expected to obtain employment in the very 
near future at $54,000 per year, upon which 
child support is set at $300 per month per 
child, payable one-half on the 5th and one-
half on the 20th of each month. That 
[Geraldine Brown] should be ordered to 
execute any papers necessary to allow [Brent 
Brown] to claim the children as income tax 
deductions. 
8. That [Brent Brown] should pay to 
[Geraldine Brown] the sum of $200 per month 
as and for temporary alimony notwithstanding 
[Brent Brown's] unemployment. 
(Record 45-9.) 
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2. The decree awarded Geraldine Brown custody of the 
parties1 three minor children subject to liberal and reasonable 
visitation rights to Brent Brown. Brent Brown was ordered to 
maintain health and accident insurance and to split up to $600.00 
of any deductibles with Plaintiff to cover the expense 
thereafter. Plaintiff was ordered to maintain life insurance 
with the children named as beneficiaries. 
3. The decree valued and divided property owned by the 
parties. Paragraph 11 of the trial court's findings made at the 
time of the decree states: 
That the parties have acquired the following 
property during their marriage: Home in 
North Logan, $275,000; six acres in North 
Logan, $95,000, subject to an approximately 
$10,000 liability for bringing utility and 
irrigation systems to the property previously 
sold to Dr. Hawks; one-seventh interest in 
four acres at 18th North in Logan; one-fourth 
interest in 28 acres at Bear Lake, $15,000; 
one-fourth interest in the Salt Lake metal 
building, $25,000; two percent interest in 29 
acres Temple View Salt Lake City, $20,000; 
hangar for aircraft, $10,000; 1985 Buick Park 
Avenue, $10,000; 1983 Buick Century $4,500; 
1981 Buick Riviera, $6,000; 1983 19-foot 
power boat, $10,000; 1979 aircraft, $80,000; 
1985 Ford 1210 tractor and accessories, 
$9,300; 1982 1100 Suzuki motorcycle, $2,000; 
profit sharing fund with ISE, $59,212.58; 
one-half interest in BH Leasing, $20,000; 
silver, $6,000; furnishings in the home in 
North Logan, $25,000; personal property with 
[Brent Brown], $3,500; furnishings in [Brent 
Brown's] apartment, $2,390; severance pay 
from Brae Corporation, $20,000; income tax 
refund 1985 subject to any tax payable and 
costs of preparation, approximately $2,200; 
IRA accounts with $6,372 in [Brent Brown's] 
name and $4,840 in [Geraldine Brown's] name; 
Merrill Lynch accounts, $191,679.69; and 
North Park Bank stock, no value. 
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That [Geraldine Brown] should be awarded the 
home, valued at $275,000, the Buick Century, 
Buick Riviera, and the Ford tractor and 
accessories, valued at $19,800; and the 
furnishings in the home valued at $25,000 and 
the North Park Bank stock of no value; and 
[Geraldine Brown] should be awarded the 
balance of the property except for the Brae 
severance pay which should be split between 
the parties, the net income tax refund, 
which should be split between the parties, 
and each party should be awarded their IRA 
accounts with [Brent Brown] paying to 
[Geraldine Brown] $766 for the difference. 
[Geraldine Brown] should be awarded 
$108,016,13 of the $191,679.69 of the Merrill 
Lynch account for 56.352 percent of the said 
fund. 
4. Subsequent to the divorce, one of the three children 
reached the age of majority. At the time of the modification 
hearing, two children were minors: A son, 13, and a daughter, 7. 
(Transcript, page 17, lines 21-25; page 18, lines 1-6.) 
5. Subsequent to the divorce, Geraldine Brown turned the 
management of her investments to a financial planner, Aaron 
Lichfield (Transcript, page 43, lines 14-25; page 44, page 45, 
lines 1-12; page 58, lines 7-25; pages 59-71), received 
approximately $10,000.00 per year from the investments 
(Transcript, page 82, lines 12-23), chose not to sell the home 
(Transcript, page 72, lines 5-21; page 84, lines 7-25; page 85, 
lines 1-16; page 119, lines 16-25; pages 120-121; page 122, lines 
1-17), in the approximately three years since the divorce took 
four college courses at Utah State University totaling 17 hours 
of credit (Transcript, page 867, lines 20-25; pages 87-87; page 
90, lines 9-14; page 111, lines 13-25; pages 112-115; page 117, 
lines 20-25; page 118; page 119, lines 1-15), did not decide 
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what field to pursue in school (Transcript, page 89, lines 1-7), 
has not looked for a job (Transcript, page 89, lines 8-25; page 
90, lines 1-10; page 109, lines 19-25; page 110; page 111, lines 
1-12; page 116, lines 17-23), planned to take eight or more 
years to graduate from college (Transcript, page 90, lines 
11-14). 
6. Geraldine Brown stipulated at the time of her deposition 
that except for a lack of skills, she has the ability to work. 
In response to Brent Brown's counsel's question, she and her 
counsel stated: 
Q. And in addition, aside from the 
limitations you've given, you're healthy and 
have the ability to work? 
A. Define "ability." 
Q. Well, you can go to work for eight 
hours a day. 
Mr. Jewell: We acknowledge that. We'll 
stipulate that she has the ability. 
Q. All right. 
(Deposition of Geraldine K. Brown, taken January 4, 1989, page 
58, lines 17-23. ) 
7. Geraldine Brown's living expenses decreased from the 
time of the divorce decree to the time of the modification. 
Neither the original decree findings nor the modification 
findings refer specifically to the living expenses of Geraldine 
Brown. The only evidence produced on Geraldine Brown's expenses 
was testimony given by Geraldine Brown in response to Brent 
Brown's counsel at the modification trial: 
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Q. All right. Now, let me just ask you 
these questions. We know what you are 
talking about now the time of the decree, the 
court set your living expenses at $2,200. 
That's what he found your living expenses to 
be on a monthly basis is $2,200. If you take 
$2,200 and you multiply that by 12 months, 
your monthly living expenses are right around 
$26.4. That's what the judge saw at the time 
of your divorce. Now, if you look at your 
monthly expenses over '86, f87 and f88, you 
were very close every year to that $26.4, 
aren't you? 
A. Yes, that's right. 
Q. In fact, in '86--
A. Not this year. 
Q. In '86 you were right on it. In '87 
you were a little high. And in '88 we 
analyzed a figure of $25.5. You are below 
it, right? 
A. That's right. 
Q. At $25,500 during 1988 your living 
expenses right now are $900 lower than they 
were at the time of the decree of divorce. 
Correct? 
A. That's right. I'm trying to cut 
back every where I can. 
Q. And you were asked explicitly in 
your deposition whether or not your costs and 
expenses have generally increased. And it's 
true, is it not, that you testified that your 
cost and expenses have not increased since 
the time of entry of decree of divorce. That 
is the truth, is it not? 
A. Well, it's not totally true, no. 
Q. Let me turn you to page 44 of your 
deposition. I'll ask you if these are the 
questions and answers you gave me when I 
asked you those questions at the time of your 
deposition. Start with line 2. 44,. line 2. 
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"Question: Now, do you claim that 
you've had increased cost and expenses since 
the time of the decree of divorce? 
"Answer: No, I don't. 
"Question: Do you agree that the cost 
or what the judge determined at the time of 
trial was your legitimate living expenses are 
still your legitimate living expenses? 
"Answer: My living expenses at the time 
of the divorce were based on six people 
living in the household, 
"Question: Have your expenses gone 
down? 
"Answer: Well, they have. There are 
just four people in the household, 
"Question: How much have they gone 
down. Answer that percentages. 
"Answer: Two-sixths. Two-sixths worth. 
Ifm talking about household expenses. I'm 
not talking about overall expenses because he 
was a very expensive man to live with. 
"Question: But your household expenses 
since the time of the entry of decree of 
divorce have gone down one-third. Two-sixths 
is one-third. 
"Answer: I know. I'd say my household 
expenses have gone down exactly that amount." 
Where those the questions and answers 
that you gave to me when I asked you those 
questions? 
A. Yes. I'm referring to utilities 
type of expenses. 
Q. Household expenses? 
A. Utility and food type things. 
(Transcript, page 128, lines 7-25; page 129; page 130, lines 
1-20. ) 
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8. Subsequent to the divorce, Brent Brown was forced to 
liquidate assets awarded him in the divorce to meet support 
obligations. (Transcript, page 141, lines 19-25; page 142, 
line 1.) 
9. Subsequent to the divorce, Brent Brown repurchased 
Integrated Systems Engineering, a business he established, ran, 
and sold prior to the divorce. (Transcript, page 19, lines 16-
25; page 20; page 21, lines 1-10; page 24, lines 4-20.) In order 
to rebuy Integrated Systems Engineering, Brent Brown took out 
loans for the down payment and had to liquidate almost all of the 
remaining assets he had been awarded in the divorce decree to pay 
the loans. (Transcript, page 142, lines 2-15.) 
10. To meet the support obligations and to pay back the 
loans on the down payment, Brent Brown liquidated approximately 
$56,000.00 in marketable securities, land, and an airplane. 
(Transcript, page 162, lines 12-25; page 163; page 164, lines 
1-19. ) 
11. Brent Brown testified his current earnings are 
$6,000.00 per month plus $150.00 per month in dividends. 
(Transcript, page 149, lines 17-24; page 167, lines 17-23.) 
12. Brent Brown testified that his expenses have increased 
commensurate with his income and he is still short from month to 
month, forcing continued liquidation of assets. (Transcript, 
page 149, lines 17-25; pages 150-158; page 159, lines 1-11; 
Plaintiff's Exhibit #4.) As testified by Brent Brown in response 
to questions from his counsel: 
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Q. Now, if you take your monthly 
expenses and add them up, there's about 
$5,210. And if you look at when you say you 
have about 4,000 a month by declaring your 
withholding tax at the end of the year, you 
still run short. Have you noticed that? 
A. Oh, yes. 
Q. How have you--what have you been 
doing to be able to handle your monthly 
expenses? 
A. Borrow, liquidate. Had to liquidate 
assets and in some cases borrow money. 
Q. Okay. Now, as you look back from 
the time of the decree, the time the decree 
was entered until now, have your monthly 
expenses increased? 
A. Yes. 
(Transcript, page 158, lines 20-25; page 159, lines 1-8.) 
13. Brent Brown continues to maintain life insurance as 
required under the decree. (Transcript, page 155, lines 16-18.) 
14. Brent Brown has paid on college tuition and books and 
mission expense for the two children who are no longer minors. 
(Transcript, page 158, lines 7-19.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court's finding of a change in circumstances 
based on an increase in Brent Brown's income, failing to 
recognize a commensurate increase in Brent Brown's expenses, 
Brent Brown's liquidation of assets, a decrease in the needs of 
Geraldine Brown and the children, and the absence of reasonable 
efforts by Geraldine Brown to work or even obtain an education or 
training was an abuse of discretion and a misapplication or 
misunderstanding of the law. Where Geraldine Brown has the 
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burden to show a substantial change of circumstances, and has 
failed to her burden, the order and judgment should be reversed. 
2. Even if there was a substantial change in circumstances, 
the trial court abused its discretion in increasing alimony and 
child support and should be reversed where the evidence showed a 
decrease in the needs of Geraldine Brown and the children, no 
reasonable efforts on the part of Geraldine Brown to employ, 
educate or train herself, and no attempts by Geraldine Brown to 
sell the house awarded her in the divorce, valued at $275,000,00, 
and much too large for Geraldine Brown's and the children's 
needs. 
3. The lack of findings by the trial court on Geraldine 
Brown's and the children's needs and Geraldine Brown's ability to 
provide for herself is also reversible error. 
4. Finally, there being no evidence or findings of 
Geraldine Brown's need for payment of her attorney fees by Brent 
Brown, the trial court abused its discretion and misapplied or 




WHERE GERALDINE BROWN'S AND THE CHILDREN'S 
EXPENSES DECREASED AND BRENT BROWN'S EXPENSES 
INCREASED COMMENSURATE TO HIS INCOME, THERE 
WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES 
WHICH WOULD WARRANT A MODIFICATION OF THE 
DECREE OF DIVORCE. 
Geraldine Brown's own testimony at trial was that Geraldine 
Brown's and the children's expenses at the time of the 
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modification hearing were the less than at the time of the 
divorce, Geraldine Brown testified the current support and 
income from her investments roughly equaled the expenses for her 
and the children. Further, Geraldine Brown testified she had 
never looked for a job, in three years had only taken four 
college courses, needed eight years to finish college, after 
which she would look for employment, and had made no attempts to 
sell her $275,000 house. 
The only factor the trial court specifically considered with 
respect to its increase in alimony and child support was Brent 
Brown's increase in income from $54,000.00 at the time of the 
decree to $72,000.00 at the time of the modification hearing. 
Apparently ignored was the increase in expenses. The only reason 
Brent Brown is making more money is he put at risk all of the 
assets. If he had just taken a regular job at $54,000.00 per 
year, he still would have the income from his investments and no 
change of circumstances. 
In order for the trial court to order a modification of 
alimony or child support, there must first be a finding of a 
substantial change in circumstances. As stated by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Kiesel v. Kiesel, 619 P.2d 1374 (Utah 1980): 
"A trial court is justified in modifying a prior decree of 
divorce where the parties [sic] seeking modification proves a 
substantial and permanent change of circumstances necessitating 
the modification." 619 P.2d at 1376. 
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The burden of showing a substantial change of circumstances 
is on the moving party. Christensen v. Christensen, 628 P.2d 
1297 (Utah 1981). In this case, Geraldine Brown was the moving 
party and it was her burden to show a substantial change of 
circumstances. 
The only change in circumstances shown by Geraldine Brown in 
this case is that Brent Brown earned more money than at the time 
of the decree. For the trial court to base a finding of a 
substantial change on a change in income only, without 
consideration of increased expenses of the payor and the 
financial circumstances of the payee and the children, is an 
abuse of discretion and a misunderstanding or misapplication of 
the law. 
In Porco v. Porco, 79 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 (Utah App. 1988), 
the Utah Court of Appeals upheld a trial court's ruling that 
there was not a substantial change of circumstances where 
"expenses have also increased proportionately" to income. ibid. 
Brent Brown's income has increased, but he has also re-purchased 
a business, remarried, and purchased a home, and consequently has 
greater expenses, as he testified at trial. 
In Lord v. Shaw, 682 P.2d 853 (Utah 1984), the Supreme 
Court gave the following analysis: 
Mrs. Lord claims that she has shown a 
sufficient change in circumstances since the 
original divorce decree to warrant an 
increase in child support for the three 
children residing with her. The change in 
circumstances cited by Mrs. Lord include: an 
increase in Mr. Shaw's income; an increase in 
the cost of living; an increase in the needs 
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of the children now that they are older; and 
increased housing expenses. The following 
facts cut against Mrs, Lord: Mr. Shawfs 
remarriage and his responsibility to his 
step-children; the increased cost of living 
which also affects Mr. Shaw; Mrs. Lord's 
remarriage; the completion of Mrs. Lord's 
education; and Mr. Shaw's support of his 
three older children who are living with him. 
Based on these circumstances, the trial court 
held that a sufficient change in 
circumstances had not been shown to warrant a 
reassessment of the child support payments. 
Parties to a divorce decree will undoubtedly 
experience economic and other changes 
following a divorce, but a modification in 
the decree is justified only when a party 
shows a substantial change in circumstances. 
682 P.2d at 856. 
As was the case in Lord, supra, there were economic changes 
in this case since the decree. While it is true that Brent 
Brown's income increased only because of liquidation of assets to 
invest in his business, it is also true that his expenses 
increased. On the other hand, Geraldine Brown's economic 
situation remained stable—she suffered no decline in income, 
neither she nor the children suffered any want of need nor 
produced any evidence that they were in need of additional 
support. Geraldine Brown's expenses were less than when the 
decree was entered. Geraldine Brown still remained out of the 
work force and made only token efforts to obtain education or 
training. 
In the plain language of Kiesel, supra, there must be "a 
substantial and permanent change of circumstances necessitating 
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the modification." A change in the payor's income does not of 
itself "necessitate" a modification. 
The evidence in this case is not sufficient for a finding of 
a substantial change of circumstances by the trial court. In so 
finding, the trial court abused its discretion and misunderstood 
or misapplied the law and the order of increased alimony and 
child support should be reversed. 
II 
WHERE THE DECREE PROVIDED FOR "TEMPORARY 
ALIMONY", AND GERALDINE BROWN HAS MADE NO 
EFFORT OR ONLY TOKEN EFFORT TO OBTAIN AN 
EDUCATION OR TRAINING, THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED 
ITS DISCRETION ,IN AWARDING AN INCREASE IN 
ALIMONY. 
At the time of the divorce, both parties were unemployed, 
though the trial court imputed $54,000.00 per year income to 
Brent Brown. Since the divorce, Brent Brown re-purchased 
Integrated Systems Engineering, committed his assets and energy 
to its success, and remarried and purchased a house. Geraldine 
Brown continued to care for the parties' children and remained in 
the marital home, but made no effort or only token effort to 
obtain employment or to educate or train herself for employment. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that the purpose of alimony 
at the time of the divorce is to equalize the standard of living 
for both spouses, maintain them at their present standard of 
living as much as possible, and avoid the necessity of one spouse 
receiving public assistance. Higley v. Higley, 676 P.2d 379 
(Utah 1983). In the lead case of Jones v. Jones, the Court 
reiterated the factors to be examined in determining alimony: 
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(1) the financial conditions and needs of 
the wife; 
(2) the ability of the wife to produce a 
sufficient income for herself; and 
(3) the ability of the husband to provide 
support. 
Jones at 1075. 
These criteria were previously adopted in English v. 
English, 565 P.2d 409, 411-12 (Utah 1977), where the Court 
stated: 
The most important function of alimony is to 
provide support for the wife as nearly as 
possible at the standard of living she 
enjoyed during marriage, and to prevent the 
wife from becoming a public charge. English 
v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977). 
The trial court should consider "the 
financial conditions and needs of the wife, 
the ability of the wife to produce a 
sufficient income for herself; and the 
ability of the husband to provide support." 
Id. at 411-12. See also Boyle v. Boyle, 735 P.2d 669, 671 (Utah 
App. 1987). 
In this case, the decree of divorce fulfilled all of the 
criteria set forth by the Utah Supreme Court and Utah Court of 
Appeals. The decree met the financial needs of Geraldine Brown 
as presented by her to the trial court by awarding her alimony in 
addition to substantial income producing assets. The trial court 
imputed $54,000.00 per year income to Brent Brown even though he 
was unemployed. By awarding temporary alimony, the trial court 
presumably expected that Geraldine Brown would take reasonable 
steps to educate, train, and employ herself to assist in her own 
support. 
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Just as Brent Brown took steps to meet his obligations under 
the decree of divorce by gaining employment, which required him 
to liquidate assets and take out loans, so too should Geraldine 
Brown be required to take responsibility for her own support and 
make similar efforts to get an education and/or training for 
employment sufficient to support herself so that she is no longer 
a burden to Brent Brown or the state. The record is clear that 
unlike Brent Brown, Geraldine Brown has failed to make good faith 
efforts to meet her own support responsibilities. A finding of 
Brent Brown's good faith efforts to regain employment and 
fulfillment of his support obligations and Geraldine Brown's 
failure to seek education, training or employment in order to 
assist in the support of her and the children and liquidation of 
the home which far exceeds her needs, should, at the least, 
preclude a modification increasing her alimony. At most, it 
should be the basis for an admonition by the Court for Geraldine 
Brown to begin the necessary steps to eventually be able to 
provide for her own support. 
Ill 
THE FAILURE OF THE TRIAL COURT TO MAKE 
FINDINGS ON GERALDINE BROWN'S FINANCIAL 
CONDITION AND NEEDS AND HER ABILITY TO 
PRODUCE A SUFFICIENT INCOME FOR HERSELF IS 
REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
The court made no findings with respect to Geraldine Brown's 
financial condition and needs and ability to support herself. 
The law in this area is well settled. The trial court's failure 
to make findings in disputed areas of fact is reversible error. 
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As stated by the Court of Appeals in Throckmorton v. 
Throckmorton, 98 Utah Adv. Rep. 58 (Utah App. 1988): 
Moreover, it is reversible error if a trial 
court fails to make findings on all material 
issues unless the facts in the record are 
"'clear, uncontroverted, and capable of 
supporting only a finding in favor of the 
judgment.' " Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 
999 (Utah 1987) (quoting Kinkella v. Baugh, 
660 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983)). 
Utah courts have consistently found an abuse 
of discretion in setting alimony when the 
trial court failed to make findings on the 
financial conditions and needs of the 
receiving spouse. See, e.g., Higley v. 
Higley, 676 P.2d 379, 382 (Utah 1983) 
(remanded since the trial court made no 
findings with regard to the receiving 
spouse's ability to work); Rusham v. Rusham, 
742 P.2d 123, 126 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (trial 
court failed to adequately address the 
financial needs of the claimant spouse, 
making it necessary for the reviewing court 
to remand the issue for further findings). 
There being insufficient findings in this case with respect 
to the financial condition and needs of Geraldine Brown, and 
Geraldine Brown's ability to work, the order increasing alimony 
and child support should be reversed. 
IV 
WHERE THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OR FINDING OF 
NEED ON THE PART OF GERALDINE BROWN, THE 
TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
AWARDING GERALDINE BROWN A JUDGMENT AGAINST 
BRENT BROWN FOR ATTORNEY FEES. 
Preliminary to an award of attorney fees, the trial court 
must make a finding of need. As quoted in Talley v. Talley, 739 
P.2d 83 (Utah App. 1987), the Utah Supreme Court stated in Huck 
v. Huck, 734 P.2d 417, 419 (Utah 1986): "In divorce cases, an 
-18-
award of attorney fees must be supported by evidence that it is 
reasonable in amount and reasonably needed by the party 
requesting the award." 
The trial court again focused on Brent Brown's income being 
greater than that of Geraldine Brown. Though the Court 
recognized in its memorandum decision that Geraldine Brown 
received income from the assets and support awarded in the decree 
of divorce, the Court did not address the home, which has 
substantial value, Geraldine Brown's ability to earn income, 
Geraldine Brown's expenses, or otherwise determine Geraldine 
Brown's need. 
Where Geraldine Brown's resources were sufficient for her to 
pay her own attorney fees, and the Court failed to make specific 
findings showing a need on the part of Geraldine Brown, the award 
of attorney fees should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Brent Brown respectfully requests that the Order and 
Judgment modifying the Decree of Divorce as to alimony and child 
support and awarding Geraldine Brown a judgment against Brent 
Brown for her attorney fees be reversed. 
Dated this *-* day of August, 1989. 
HILLYARD, ANDERSON & OLSEN 
ItfYLE W. HIL 
Attoimey for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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Hl fARD, LOW & ANDERSON 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
A T T O R N E Y S A T l - A W 
175 EAST FIRST NORTH 
L O G A N , U T A H 84321 
TELEPHONE (801) 752-2610 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRENT "W" BROWN, ] 
Plaintiff, 
VS. ; 
GERALDINE K. BROWN, ] 
Defendant. ] 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 24569 
THIS MATTER came on for hearing on the 12th day of 
March, 1986, before the Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen, 
District Judge. Personally appeared the Plaintiff and his 
attorney, Lyle W. Hillyard, and the Defendant and her 
attorney, George W. Preston; the parties were sworn and 
testified and documentary evidence was presented; the Court 
having heard the testimony of the parties continued the matter 
until March 14, 1986, at which time, counsel presented their 
closing arguments and the Court rendered its decision, and 
makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That the parties are now and have been for three 
months immediately preceding the filing of this action 
residents of the County of Cache, State of Utah. 
2. That the parties were married to each other on the 
25th day of June, 1965, in Salt Lake City, Utah, andJiave_be£n 
Number r^V-Aifr'Y-
and now are husband and wife. 
fiEO MAR28198G 
lIK SETH S. AUJEMf Cterll 
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3. That four children have been born as issue of this 
marriage, three of whom are minors, to-wit: LISA BROWN, born 
June 6, 1969, CLIFFORD BROWN, born September 3, 1975, and 
JENNIFER ANN BROWN, born September 8, 1981, and no more 
children are expected. 
4. That Defendant is a fit and proper person and 
should be awarded the care, custody and control of the minor 
children, subject to liberal and reasonable visitation rights 
of the Plaintiff. 
5. That during the course of the marriage, Plaintiff 
has been the recipient of cruel treatment by the Defendant 
causing him great mental and physical distress and upset and 
making it impossible for him to remain married to the 
Defendant. 
6. That this marriage has deteriorated and there is no 
possibility of reconciliation; therefore, the statutory 
waiting periods before this divorce is heard or made final 
should be waived. 
7. That although Plaintiff is currently unemployed, 
his past work record and potential means that he is reasonably 
expected to obtain employment in the very near future at 
$54,000 per year, upon which child support is set at $300 per 
month per child, payable one-half on the 5th and one-half on 
the 20th of each month. That the Defendant should be ordered 
to execute any papers necessary to allow Plaintiff to claim 
the children as income tax deductions. 
Findings and Conclusions - Page 2 
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8. That Plaintiff should pay to Defendant the sum of 
$200 per month as and for temporary alimony notwithstanding 
Plaintiff's unemployment. 
9. That Plaintiff should maintain any health and 
accident insurance that he now has for the benefit of the 
children and Defendant; and, if he becomes employed and health 
and accident insurance is available through his employment, he 
should maintain that insurance on his children for as long as 
there is a child support obligation. Plaintiff should pay any 
major medical or dental expense not covered by insurance in 
excess of $600 or more per single incident. All deductibles 
not covered by the health and accident insurance or the first 
$600 on a major event, should be split equally between the 
parties. 
10. The Plaintiff should maintain his life insurance 
with an approximate death benefit value of $88,000, with the 
children alone as beneficiaries for as long as there is a 
child support obligation. 
11. That the parties have acquired the following 
property during their marriage: Home in North Logan, 
$275,000; six acres in North Logan, $95,000, subject to an 
approximately $10,000 liability for bringing utility and 
irrigation systems to the property previously sold to Dr. 
Hawks; one-seventh interest in four acres at 18th North in 
Logan, $6,000; one-fourth interest in 28 acres at Bear Lake, 
Findings and Conclusions - Page 3 
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$15,000; one-fourth interest in the Salt Lake City metal 
building, $25,000; two percent interest in 29 acres Temple 
View Salt Lake City, $20,000; hangar for aircraft, $10,000; 
1985 Buick Park Avenue, $10,000; 1983 Buick Century $4,500; 
1981 Buick Riveria, $6,000; 1983 19-foot power boat, $10,000; 
1979 aircraft, $80,000; 1985 Ford 1210 tractor and 
CM 
S accessories, $9,300; 1982 1100 Suzuki motorcycle, $2,000; 
X 
< 
5 profit sharing fund with ISE, $59,212.58; one-half interest in 
z 
§ BH Leasing, $10,000; silver, $6,000; furnishings in the home 
in North Logan, $25,000; personal property with the Plaintiff, 
Z $3,550; furnishings in Plaintiff's apartment, $2,390; 
X 
H severance pay from Brae Corporation, $20,000; income tax 
< 
£ refund 1985 subject to any tax payable and costs of 
o preparation, approximately $2,200; IRA accounts with $6,372 in 
U) 
| Plaintiff's name and $4,840 in Defendant's name; Merrill Lynch 
< 
^ accounts, $191,679.69; and North Park Bank stock, no value. 
o 
-j 
S That the Defendant should be awarded the home, valued 
< 
> 
i at $275,000, the Buick Century, Buick Riveria, and the Ford 




 furnishings in the home valued at $25,000 and the North Park 
< 
Bank stock of no value; and the Defendant should be awarded 
the balance of the property except for the Brae severance pay 
which should be split between the parties, the net income tax 
refund, which should be split between the parties, and each 
party should be awarded their IRA accounts with the Plaintiff 
paying to the Defendant $766 for the difference. Defendant 
Findings and Conclusions - Page 4 
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should be awarded $108,016.13 of the $191,679.69 of the 
Merrill Lynch account for 56.352 percent of the said fund. 
12. Each party should pay their own attorney fees and 
costs of court. 
13. Each party should execute any and all documents 
required to transfer title as necessary. 
The Court having made its Findings of Fact, makes the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That Plaintiff should be awarded a decree of 
divorce from Defendant to become final upon signing. 
2. That Defendant should be awarded the care, control 
and custody of the minor children, to-wit: LISA BROWN, 
CLIFFORD BROWN, and JENNIFER ANN BROWN; subject to liberal and 
reasonable visitation rights of the Plaintiff. 
3. That a judgment and decree should be entered in 
conformance with the foreging Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law. 
DATED this 2 f7 day of March, 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
VeNoy Christaffersen 
District Judge 
APPROVED AS T0EOEE1L 
Geprge W. Preston 
Attorney for Defendant 
Findings and Conclusions - Page 5 
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Hi YARD. LOW & ANDERSON 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
A T T O R N E Y S A T L A W 
175 EAST FIRST NORTH 
L O G A N , U T A H 84321 
TELEPHONE (801) 752-2610 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT' OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRENT MW" BROWN, 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
GERALDINE K. BROWN, ] 
Defendant. ] 
) DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 24569 
THIS MATTER came on for hearing on the 12th day of 
March, 1986, before the Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen, 
District Judge. Personally appeared the Plaintiff and his 
attorney, Lyle W. Hillyard, and the Defendant and her 
attorney, George W. Preston; the parties were sworn and 
testified and documentary evidence was presented; the Court 
having heard the testimony of the parties continued the matter 
until March 14, 1986, at which time, counsel presented their 
closing arguments and the Court rendered its decision, and 
having heretofore made its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law now makes and enters the following order: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That the Plaintiff, BRENT "W" BROWN, is hereby 
granted a decree of divorce from the Defendant, GERALDINE K. 
BROWN, to become final upon signing hereof. 
2. That the Defendant is hereby awarded the care, 
custody and control of the minor children, to-wit: LISA 
BROWN, born June 6, 1969, CLIFFORD BROWN, born September 3, 
-7-
1975, and JENNIFER ANN BROWN, born September 8, 1981, subject 
to liberal and reasonable visitation rights of the Plaintiff. 
3. That Plaintiff is ordered to pay child support at 
$300 per month per child, payable one-half on the 5th and one-
half on the 20th of each month. That the Defendant is ordered 
to execute -any papers necessary to allow Plaintiff to claim 
CM 
S the children as income tax deductions. 





3 sum of $200 per month as and for temporary alimony 
-j 
iE notwithstanding Plaintiff's unemployment. 
X 
o 
K 5. That Plaintiff is ordered to maintain any health 
X 
Hand accident insurance that he now has for the benefit of the 
< 
jn children and Defendant; and, if he becomes employed and health 
oand accident insurance is available through his employment, he 
u) 
x 
§ shall maintain that insurance on his children for as long as 
< 
$ there is a child support obligation. Plaintiff shall pay any 
o 
.j 
Qmajor medical or dental expense not covered by the health and 
< 
ij accident insurance in excess of $600 or more per single 
i 
j«j incident. All deductibles not covered by insurance or the 
0
 first $600 on a major event, shall be split equally between 
< 
Jthe parties. 
6. The Plaintiff is ordered to maintain his life 
insurance with an approximate death benefit value of $88,000, 
with the children alone as beneficiaries for as long as there 
is a child support obligation. 
Decree of Divorce - Page 2 
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7. That the Defendant is awarded the following 
property of the parties: Home in North Logan valued at 
$275,000; the Buick Century, Buick Riveria, and the Ford 
tractor and accessories, valued at $19,800; the furnishings in 
the home valued at $25,000; one-half of the Brae severance 
pay; one-half of the 1985 net income tax refund; her IRA 
2 account plus $766 as the difference between her account and 
X 
< 
3 Plaintiff's account; the North Park Bank stock and her 
z 
S personal effects; and $108,016.13 of the $191,679.69 of the 
f Merrill Lynch account for 56.352 percent of said fund. 
X 
o 
H 8. That the Plaintiff is awarded all other property of 
X 
t the parties including the six acres in North Logan, $95,000; 
< 
£ one-seventh interest in four acres at 18th North in Logan, 
o $6,000; one-fourth interest in 28 acres at Bear Lake, $15,000; 
<n 
x 
§ one-fourth interest in the Salt Lake City metal building, 
< 
$$25,000; two percent interest in 29 acres Temple View Salt 
o 
gLake City, $20,000; hangar for aircraft, $10,000; 1985 Buick 
i Park Avenue, $10,000; 1983 19-foot power boat, $10,000; 1979 
§ aircraft, $80,000; $9,300; 1982 1100 Suzuki motorcycle, 0$2,000; profit sharing fund with ISE, $59,212.58; one-half 
< 
interest in BH Leasing, $10,000; silver, $6,000; personal 
property with the Plaintiff, $3,550; furnishings in 
Plaintifffs apartment, $2,390; one-half of his severance pay 
from Brae Corporation; one-half of the 1985 net income tax 
refund; his IRA account; his personal effects; and the balance 
of the Merrill Lynch account. 
Decree of Divorce - Page 3 
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9. Each party is ordered to pay their own attorney 
fees and costs of court. 
10. Each party is ordered to execute any and all 
documents required to transfer title as necessary. 
DATED this --' / day of March, 1986. 
i 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: / 
Jr >- . ^, / - V 
GeorgeAW. Preston 
Attorney for Defendant 
BY THE COURT: 
i 
I , I 
i 
VeNoy Christbffersen 
District Judge j 
Decree of Divorce - Page 4 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRENT "W" BROWN, ) 
Plaintiff ] 
v. 
GERALDINE K. BROWN, 
Defendant 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
1 Civil No. 24569 
The parties were divorced in March of 1986• The Plaintiff 
prior to divorce was a partner in a company called Intergrated 
Systems Engineering which he later sold and was taken on as an 
employee by the purchaser. Testimony indicated that the year 
prior to the divorce when he was in this situation his income 
was $100,000.00+ annually. At the time of the divorce, his incom.. 
was zero having terminated any employment. At that time, based 
on the prior track record of the plaintiff, indicated that he was 
not going to remain at zero income and indicated that he had the 
ability to generate income. 
The Court estimiated an income of at least historically of 
$54,000.00 minimum. An alimony order of $200.00 per month was 
granted based upon that projection and $300.00 per month per child 
support for three children. It was estimated that he would soon be 
making again substantial monies was correct and was a conservative 
estimate because the evidence shows that the year after his divorce 
he purchased Intergrated Systems Engineering himself and his own 
personal financial statement submitted to a bank in September, 
-11-
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Civil No. 24569 
Page Two 
1988 he declares now a net worth of $1,157,000.00 and an annual 
income of $130,000.00 per year. 
The defendant has filed a Petition based on this change of 
circumstances for an increase in child support and alimony. 
Defendant has submitted as Exhibit 4, a financial statement updated 
from the September 19 8 8 Financial Statement he submitted to the 
bank in which he declares his monthly income of $10,000.00 per mo:* 
as only $6,000.00. The Court recognizes that financial statements 
submitted to banks for purposes of loans are probably inflated and 
that financial statements submitted to the Court in divorce actions 
are probably deflated, and the figure is somewhere inbetween. 
The Court finds that in any event that there is a substantial 
change of circumstances in the defendant's income and it does not 
appear simply to be coincidental that his income the year before his 
divorce was in the $100,000.00+ category annually and no income at 
the time of divorce and then two years later his income is in the 
$130,000.00 range at least so reflected on the statements submitted 
to the bank last September. 
The Plaintiff testified that there was several reasons lor the 
decrease in his projected earnings in September, 19 8 8 and his new 
present financial declaration. Mainly being the type of business 
he has and the necessity of liquidation of assets and the necessity 
of decreasing his own income monthly because of the business 
problems. He eliminated his bonuses, and has liquidated his stocks 
wherein he had formerly received interest and dividend income. If 
-12-
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this was because of the Petition for Modification was filed of ccurs 
is not known and the Court will not assume that to be the case. 
However, the Court feels his present financial declaration which 
is his Exhibit 4, is more conservative than his actual income. 
The Court feels that the $130,000.00 on his financial statement of 
September 19 88 which is defendant's Exhibit 3 is probably inflaLed, 
The Court will depart from the established guidelines because 
of the factor of the debt structure that was testified to by the 
plaintiff in his business that he now solely cvns but will joe J^c 
$72,000.00 September figure deducting therefrom the bonus commission 
and dividend income and arrive at a figure of $700.00 per month per 
child as the modified order on child support payments. The Court 
feels this is equitable taking into account the debt structure of 
Integrated Systems Engineering from where he received his income. 
As factors on alimony you have to take into account his increased 
ability to provide the standard of living -that is now compatabie with 
his income taking into account those factors listed in the English 
case, the Jones case, and the Nelson case, taking into account 
to try to maintain as close as you can the same standard of living 
at this time as was available before and an ability at the present 
time to pay and the needs of the defendant. The Court will therefor: 
increase the alimony award to $500.00 per month. 
Defendant is also asking attorneyfs fees for this. Section 
30-3-3 of the U.C.A. has been interpreted to include actions for 
-13-
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Modification. See Kallas v. Kallas, 614 P.2nd 641. Plaintiff's 
ability to pay attorney's fees is obviously much greater than 
that of the defendant, the defendant only having the income that 
she realizes from investment of funds she received from the divorce 
plus her child support and alimony. Defendant's counsel testified 
as to the hours and the necessity of the amount of hours for 
purpose of his hearing and the reasonableness of his hourly fee 
and with the figure of around $4,000.00 attorney!s fees. However 
in checking over his Exhibit showing the amount of time spent, 
namely concerning the cost of the curb or gutter. The Court feels 
there are some items that were not necessary and has therefore 
reduced the attorney's fees award to $3,000.00 as opposed to 
$4,000.00 plus costs. 
Counsel for defendant to prepare the appropriate modification 
order. 
Dated this Q day of March, 19 89. 
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Stephen W- Jewell, 3814 
Attorney at. Law 
15 South Wairj, Third Floor 
First. Security Bank Building 
Logan, Utah 34321 
Telephone: i801) 753-2000 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRENT •*• BROWN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs« 
GERALDIME k\ BROWN, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 24569 
This matter came on hearing before the Court, the 
Honorable VeMoy Christoffersen presiding, on January 17, 1989, 
and again on February 2S# 1989. Defendant was present and 
represented by counsel, Stephen W. Jewell- Plaintiff was 
present only on February 2Q, 1989, and represented by counsel 
on January 17, 1989, and February 28, 1989- The Court having 
heard the evidence and testimonies presented and the arguments 
of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, now finds 
and concludes as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1» The parties were divorced on or about. March IS, 
1986-
2. Prior t.o the divorce, Plain-till was a partner in a 
company called INTEGRATED SYSTEMS ENGINEERING, which he later 
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3* Prior to the divorce, Plaintiff's income was in 
ex c ess of £1OO,OOO.00. 
4* At the time ol the divorce. Plaintill's income vas 
zero, having terminated any employment* 
5. At the time ol the divorce, based on Plaintiff's 
ability to generate income, the Court estimated an income lor 
Plamtill ol at least historically $-54,000*00 minimum* An 
alimony order ol S20G.00 p&£ month was granted based on that 
projection and $300*GO p&r month lor child support lor three 
<3) ch2.1dx&n vas ordered* 
6* The year following the divorce, or m or about 
December 1986, Plaintiff purchased INTEGRATED SYSTEMS 
ENGINEERING himself and currently is the sole owner of 
INTEGRATED SYSTEMS ENGINEERING. 
7. Plaintiff's net worth as of September 1988, was 
approximately $1,157* 000* OO. 
8* Although Plaintiff r&presented on a financial 
statement to Zion's First National Bank dated September 15, 
1988, that his annual income was $130,000*00 p&T year. 
Plaintiff testified at trial that his annual income was 
actually only $72,000*00* The court recognizes that financial 
statements submitted to banks for purposes of loans are 
pirobably inflated and that financial statements submitted to 
the Court in divorce actions are pirobably deflated and that 
Plaintiff's income is somewhere m between those two figures* 
The court, however, d&aloLn&s, to establish an exact income 
figure* 
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9. It does not appear simply to be coincidental that 
Plaintiff's income the year before his divorce was in the 
$100,000.00 plus range annually and no income at the time of 
the divorce, and then tvo years later his income is again in 
the $130,000.00 range, or at. least, so reflected on the 
statement, submitted "to the bank in September of 1988. 
10. The Court, finds that, in any event there is a 
substantial and material change of circumstances in that 
Defendant*s income has increased substantially from the time 
of the divorce, sxifficient to warrant a modification of the 
d&c,r&& and to grant Defendant's Petition. 
11. The child support as previously ard&T€*d of 5200. 00 
p&T month p&T child shall be modified and increased so that 
Plaintiff shall pay $700.00 p&r month p&r child for child 
support payments. 
12. Although the Court is not specifically following 
the established child support guidelines, the Court feels this 
is equitable taking into account the debt structure of 
INTEGRATED SYSTEMS ENGINEERING from where Plaintiff receives 
his income. 
13. After taking into account as factors on alimony, 
Plaintiff*s increased ability to provide the standard of 
living that is now compatible with his income, taking into 
account those factors listed in the ENGLISH case, the JONES 
case, and the NELSON case, and taking into account the Court's 
attempt to maintain as close as possible the same standard of 
living at this time as was available at the time of the 
divorce and an ability at. the pr&s&n-t time for Plaintiff to 
3 
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ptrovxde support, the needs of Defendant.*, and the aDility of 
Defendant "to provide her own support, the Court will, 
therefore, modify the Decree and xncr&asi€* the alimony award 
from $200.00 p€^T month to $500.00 p^x month. 
14. The Court finds that the $4,000.00 paid by 
Defendant for curb and gutter assessments are the obligation 
of the Defendant as the owner of the home and are not the 
obligation of Plaintiff. 
15. Defendant's counsel testified regarding attorney's 
fees, showing the time spent, the hourly rate charged, and the 
necessity of the number of hours spent m light of the 
difficulty of the case. It was stipulated by counsel for the 
Plaintiff that the rate charged was a reasonable on& and was 
commonly charged for such actions in th& community. The Court 
finds that Plaintiff's ability to pay attorney's 1&€^B I S 
obviously much greater than that of Defendant, Defendant only 
having the income that she realises from investment of funds 
she received from the divorce plus her child support and 
alimony. However, m checking over the exhibit prov^decI by 
Defendant's counsel showing the amount of time spent, the 
court l&^ls that there are some items that were not necessary; 
namely, concerning the costs of curb and gutter, the Court, 
therefore, finds that a reasonable award of attorney's ±&&s tc 
Defendant from Plaintiff JLB $3,000.00, plus costs. 
16. There having been no evidence regarding Plaintiff's 
Counterpetition, and a Motion to Dismiss the Counterpetition 
having h&&n made by Defendant's counsel at the conclusion of 
Plaintiff's case and chief, and Plaintiff indicating his 
4 
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intent to withdraw his Counterpetition* the Court, linds that 
the Counterpetition should be dismissed. 
17* The Court- incorporates herein by reference such 
other facts and findings as are stated in the Memorandum 
Decision dated March 3, 1983* 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now enters 
the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1* There has been a substantial and material change in 
circumstances in Plaintiff's income and ability to provide 
child support, and alimony from the time of the d&c>r&&r and 
•that said substantial and material change is sufficient to 
warrant, a modification of the D&c^r€^€^ of Divorce entered in 
this matter* 
2* In view of the substantial and material change in 
circumstances* the court concludes that Defendant's Petition 
-to Modify as -to child support, and alimony should be granted 
and that child support should be increased to $700*00 p&r 
month p&r child and that alimony should be increased to 
S500*OO p&r month* 
3* The Court further concludes £4*000*00 paid by 
Defendant for curb and gutter assessment is the obligation of 
Defendant as the owner of the property and* therefore, the 
obligation of the Defendant* Defendant's Petition as to said 
curb and gutter assessment should not be granted* 
4. In veiw of the difference in earning ability and 
actual income received by both parties* Defendant has 
5 
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sufficiently demonstrated the financial ne^&d for attorney 's 
fees* The court, concludes "that. S3r GDC OO as a reasonable 
amount, for attorney's fees and -that, "the number of hours spent. 
were necessary in light, of -the difficultly of "the case,, the 
rate charged for attorney's fees vas reasonable as stipulated 
by opposing counsel and is commonly charged for divorce 
actions in the community and that, the award of attorney's fees 
is based on the need and results acheived in the case* 
5- Plaintiff's Counterpetition should be dismissed. 
6. The Order and Judgment entered in this matter shall 
be effective as of January 17, 1989. 
7. The Court incorporates herein by r&I&T&nc& such 
other conclusions of law as are stated in the Memorandum 
Decision dated March 3, 1989. 





CERTIFICATE OF WAILING 
I hereby certify "that, on the Z>j) — day of March, 1989, I 
mailed a -true and correct, copy of the foregoing Findings of 
Fact, and Conclusions of Law and Notice t.o the foregoing 
persons, postage pre-paid thereon, by depositing in the United 
States Mail* 
Richard £L Johnson 
Attorney at Lav 
1327 South 800 East, Suite 300 
Grew, UT 84058 
Brent W. Brown 
1622 East 1080 North 
Logan, UT 84321 
V A 
NOTICE 
Counsel for Plaintiff is hereby notified that piursuant to 
Rule 4-5G4<2> of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, 
counsel has five (5) days to submit any objections to the 
Court* 
DATED this^r^^2_ day of March, 1989. 
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St ephen W. Jewell, 3814 
Attorney for Defendant. 
15 South Main, Third Floor 
First. Security Bank Building 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: < 801) 753-2000 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRENT * W BROWN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GERALDIME K\ BROWN, 
Defendant -
This matter came on for hearing before the Court, the 
Honorable VeMoy Christoffersen presiding, on January 17, 1983, 
and again on February 23, 1989. Defendant was present and 
represented by counsel, Stephen W„ Jewell. Plaintiff was 
present only on February 28, 1989, and represented by counsel 
on January 17, 1989, and February 28, 1989. The Court having 
heard the evidence and testimonies pre*, ^ nted and the arguments 
of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, and 
having previously entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, now makes the following Order and Judgment. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AMD DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. The First Cause of Action and Second Cause of 
Action in Defendant's Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce, 
regarding child support and alimony respectively, shall be and 
are hereby granted. Number ^ ^ N<J ^ 0£f 
FILED FlLEC 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
* • 
Civil No. 24569 
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2. It as ordered that, child support, shall increase 
from $300.OO to $700.GO p&r month p&r child* 
3. It is further ordered that alimony shall increase 
from $200.00 to $500.00 pter month. 
4. Said modified child support and alimony payments 
shall be paid effective as of January 17, 1989, and Defendant 
is granted a 3udgment against Plaintiff for all amounts owing 
from that date to the date of this order. 
5. The Third and Fourth Causes of Action in 
Defendant's Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce regarding 
road assessments and withholding of child support and punitive 
damages shall be and are hereby denied. 
6. Defendant shall be and is hereby awarded a }udgment 
against Plaintiff as and for attorney's fees in the amount of 
$3,000.OO. 
7. All other provisions of the D&CT-&& entered 
previously in this action shall remain as stated. 
8* Plaintiff's Counter-Petition is denied and the same 
shall be and is hereby dismissed. 
DATED this ^ day of Ife^eh^ 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
/I 
VeNoy Ch^ds to^fe jr sen 
D i s t r i c t : J u d g e 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
^ . I hereby certify that on the O ^ ^ T day °* March, 1989, I 
mailed a true and correct copy oi the foregoing Order and 
Judgment and Notice to the foregoing p€>r&an&> postage pre-paid 
thereon, by depositing in the United States Mail* 
Richard B. Johnson 
Attorney at Lav 
1327 South SOO East, Suite 300 
Orem, UT S4Q58 
Brent W» Brovn 
1622 East 1080 North 
Logan, UT 84321 
it^jfc u--
NOTICE 
Counsel for Plaintiff is hereby notified that pursuant to 
Rule 4-504(2) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, 
counsel has five (5) days to submit any objections to the 
Court-
DATED this day of March, 1989-
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